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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1993 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued Staff Ac-
counting Bulletin No. 92, Accounting 
and Disclosure Relating to Loss Contin-
gencies (SAB92).   This legislation dealt 
largely with contingent liabilities, a seri-
ous issue in the chemical industry.  In 
this study we use econometric modelling 
to examine the disclosure of US chemi-
cal companies from two related perspec-
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tives: voluntary disclosure, and signal-
ing.  More specifically, we examine how 
disclosure changed following the intro-
duction of the new legislation. We also 
seek to establish the nature of the rela-
tionship, if any, between companies' ac-
tual environmental performance and 
their disclosure of environmental infor-
mation. 
 
Our paper explores the suggestion of 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Blac-
coniere and Northcut (1997) that envi-
ronmental information is a signal of 
company expertise in the management 
of environmental risks and costs.  We 
extend these prior studies by examining 
whether these 'signals' were a deliberate 
management strategy, or merely the ser-
endipitous result of investor interpreta-
tion.  Furthermore, we attempt to iden-
tify the basis for the signaling strategy, if 
that is indeed what it was.   Finally, we 
try to identify the specific types of dis-
closure that managers or investors focus 
on.  In this paper we ask the following 
questions: 
 
1. Do managers use disclosure to 
distinguish their companies from 
others? 
2. Is the basis for this distinction (if 
any) related to environmental per-
formance? 
3. Are managers trying to signal 
‘good quality’, or management 
expertise, in the area of environ-
mental management? 
 
Our paper builds on research that exam-
ines the disclosure cost/benefit trade-off.  
For example Li, Richardson and Thorn-
ton (1997) suggested that environmental 
disclosure should rise as the risk of at-
tack by outsiders falls.  Richardson 
(1998) argued that one way to increase 
disclosure would be for the government 
to publicize corporate environmental 
performance.  Bewley and Li (2000) 
found that pollution propensity, political 
exposure, and actual pollution levels are 
statistically significant in distinguishing 
the disclosure levels of companies in 
different industries.  However they 
found a stronger correlation of these 
three factors with the release of general 
environmental information than with 
financial environmental information.  
The data in our study are drawn from a 
single, high profile industry, with a large 
propensity to pollute, thereby allowing 
us to control for the factors identified in 
the Bewley and Li paper while we ex-
amine the nature of disclosure in an en-
vironment where environmental per-
formance is public knowledge.   
 
We find that companies that were volun-
tarily disclosing the information that 
SAB92 made mandatory, began disclos-
ing additional future oriented financial 
information (FOFI) after SAB92 came 
into effect.  We interpret this to be evi-
dence that these companies had deliber-
ately defined a disclosure strategy that 
entailed the use of voluntary informa-
tion.  We use toxic release inventory 
(TRI) emissions to measure environ-
mental performance, and we find, in 
keeping with Patten (2002) that the vol-
untary disclosers emit larger amounts of 
pollution per dollar of asset. This does 
not support the claim that managers use 
disclosures to signal environmental ex-
pertise, or good environmental manage-
ment.  We argue instead, that SAB92 
prompted managers to reassess the eco-
nomic costs and benefits of information 
production.  This reassessment caused a 
downward shift in the disclosure-cost 
threshold, which increases the amount of 
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information a company will voluntarily 
reveal. 
 
Unrecognized environmental liabilities 
such as those associated with Love Ca-
nal in New York triggered the US 
Superfund regulation, legislation that 
creates massive costs for industry that 
continue to this day.  The focal point in 
our study is a change in regulation per-
taining to the way these liabilities are 
measured and reported.  Our finding that 
companies with the higher prospective 
costs (arising from higher pollution lev-
els), were the companies in which man-
agement specifically engaged expertise 
to obtain information about those costs, 
and, furthermore, incurred the political 
costs of disclosing it to the public, 
should be of interest to industry analysts 
and regulators. 
    
Also of interest to regulators is the ques-
tion of whether imposing regulation is 
better for society than allowing free mar-
ket forces to elicit management choice.  
This is an on-going subject of debate. 
Sometimes regulation is imposed in re-
sponse to a high-profile problem, and 
not based on a careful analysis of costs 
and benefits.  For example, the Sar-
banes-Oxley legislation introduced in 
the US1 imposes reporting requirements 
related to a company’s internal controls. 
The consequences and costs of these 
reporting requirements are a subject of 
ongoing debate. Our study informs this 
debate by examining regulatory inven-
tion in a controlled research setting, pro-
viding insight into how regulation works 
in practice.  
 
The motivation for this study is to un-
derstand management response to a 
change in regulation.  Our focus is envi-
ronmental reporting regulation, and the 
context for our examination is the 
chemical industry in the rule-oriented 
US disclosure regime. Later in this paper 
we present a future opportunity to re-
examine this matter in Canada, where a 
change in environmental reporting regu-
lation affects a high profile sector of that 
economy. This current study examines 
environmental reporting in its early 
stage of  development. While this early 
setting limits the insights our study can 
provide given the expanded, complex 
state that environmental reporting has 
now reached in developed countries, the 
paper provides fundamental insights that 
may be relevant to developing countries 
where environmental concerns and regu-
lated reporting are at a similarly early 
stage.   
 
The next section of the paper reviews 
the prior literature and develops the 
study’s conceptual framework. The fol-
lowing section explains the study’s re-
search design and the data analysis, and 
summarizes the results. The final section 
discusses the study’s findings and its 
limitations, and provides directions for 
future related research. 
 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CON-
CEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Environmental costs are a significant 
factor in the chemical industry.  The no-
toriety of the industry has been estab-
lished through a variety of media chan-
nels, such as professional magazines 
1  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed into US law in 
2002 in response to the Enron, WorldCom and other 
corporate scandals. It was intended to strengthen the 
financial reporting system and increase the reliability of 
financial reporting for public companies. The Act im-
posed sweeping regulations affecting corporate financial 
reporting and internal control, expanded reporting re-
quirements, and imposed oversight and monitoring 
responsibilities on independent auditors.  
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(Rubenstein, 1991), in the wake of land-
contamination in Niagara Falls, New 
York, and in a docudrama (Touchstone: 
A Civil Action, 1998) examining the toll 
on human health of chemical contamina-
tion in Woburn, Massachusetts.  Both 
the general public and the investment 
community are concerned with the sub-
stantial future cash flow obligations as-
sociated with environmental impacts. 
Managers must anticipate the repercus-
sions of disclosing information about 
these impacts of business activity.  For 
example, lobby groups may be prompted 
by information disclosure to target com-
panies with calls for legislative con-
straints that could affect cash flow and 
share price.  On the other hand, greater 
disclosure could have a positive affect 
on share price if investors interpret the 
disclosure as evidence of management 
expertise, as suggested by Blacconiere 
and Patten (1994) and Blacconiere and 
Northcut (1997).  
 
When Blacconiere and Patten (1994) 
offered the following interpretation of 
share reaction to the accident in Bhopal 
(p. 375):  “If firms tend to disclose 
‘good news’ and suppress ‘bad news’ 
concerning their exposure to environ-
mental risk, investors may interpret 
these prior disclosures as a positive sig-
nal concerning the firm’s exposure … 
[to future regulatory costs],” they in ef-
fect opened the door to future explora-
tions of the relationship of environ-
mental performance with disclosure 
strategy.  This paper extends the prior 
disclosure literature by investigating the 
possibility that company managers spe-
cifically and deliberately tailor environ-
mental disclosure for strategic purposes.  
We specifically look for evidence that 
signal strategy is employed. 
 
The basic premise of signal theory is 
that a high quality firm wants to signal 
its value to the external audience. 
“Quality” can refer to many different 
things, such as investment opportunities, 
research and development, or expertise 
in managing environmental risks and 
costs. Signal theory offers companies a 
strategy for addressing the information 
asymmetry that exists between manage-
ment and the external stakeholders. 
While there could be information that 
management would like to discuss, di-
rect disclosure of certain facts could re-
veal valuable proprietary information. 
This raises the disclosure–cost threshold 
and reduces the volume of information a 
company will willingly reveal. A signal-
ing strategy employs the release of fi-
nancial or non-financial information that 
is both correlated with company quality 
and can be communicated without si-
multaneously releasing proprietary in-
formation (Healy & Palepu, 1993). Ac-
cording to signaling theory, there is an 
economic cost to management to make 
the signal, which discourages competing 
companies from mimicking the signal in 
an effort to fool its audience (Toms, 
2002; Spence, 1973). 
 
The economic perspective of informa-
tion production provides an alternative 
yet related lens for the examination of 
disclosure decisions.  The economic per-
spective argues that disclosure strategy 
requires a careful trade-off of the costs 
and benefits of disclosure.  Verrecchia 
(1990) and Richardson (1998) have ar-
gued that market forces can act as regu-
lation to determine the right amount of 
disclosure.  If insufficient information 
about risks and obligations is released, 
the capital markets will punish the com-
pany by downgrading its share value. On 
the other hand too much disclosure ex-
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poses it to the threat of increased lobby-
ing and regulatory costs (Barth, 
McNichols, & Wilson, 1997).  
 
Dye (1985) describes a framework in 
which market participants' uncertainty 
about whether or not a manager is en-
dowed with private information provides 
incentives for the manager to withhold 
unfavourable information beyond a cer-
tain threshold level.   When managers 
are uncertain of the quality of their in-
formation, their fears that capital mar-
kets will punish the company for non-
disclosure are reduced (Dye, 1985). 
However, when information about com-
pany performance is public knowledge, 
people will not assume that management 
is silent on the issue because of lack of 
knowledge, or lack of certainty.  In this 
situation management silence is likely to 
be interpreted as bad news, which could 
put downward pressure on share price.  
For this reason, if environmental per-
formance is public knowledge then man-
agement is likely to be more forthcom-
ing with information. There is empirical 
evidence to support this framework.  Li, 
Richardson and Thornton (1997) find 
the decision to disclose environmental 
liability information relates to the 
amount of private information outsiders 
believe management has, and the poten-
tial for adverse reaction by environ-
mental stakeholders. 
 
Disclosure strategy has received consid-
erable attention in the accounting litera-
ture.  Identifiable patterns of disclosure 
have been linked with company-specific 
issues such as leverage, size and finan-
cial performance (Patten, 1992; Neu, 
Warsame & Pedwell, 1998; Bewley and 
Li, 2000), and plans to raise new capital 
(Magness, 2006). However, studies of 
the correlation of environmental per-
formance with disclosure have been un-
able to define a systematic relationship, 
leading to conclusions that environ-
mental disclosure is vague, incomplete, 
or unreliable (Wiseman, 1982; Rock-
ness, 1985; Freedman and Wasley, 
1990; Gamble, Hsu, Kite and Radtke, 
1995; Deegan and Gordon, 1996).  How-
ever, these studies looked at companies 
from a variety of industries simultane-
ously, and the absence of controls for 
propensity to pollute and nature of pollu-
tion may have confounded the results. 
Furthermore a company's pollution per-
formance may play an important role in 
determining a disclosure strategy.  We 
specifically examine the role of environ-
mental performance in this paper.  Our 
understanding of that role could be the 
key to deciding whether companies en-
gage in signaling behaviour, or some 
other form of disclosure strategy. If they 
are signaling, the managers of the good 
environmental performers will disclose 
more information so as to advertise their 
companies’ ‘high quality’ status.  On the 
other hand the economic costs (such as 
loss of share value) of withholding perti-
nent information about a problem could 
lead management of a 'low quality' com-
pany to choose disclosure over silence. 
This latter type of disclosure strategy is 
more accurately captured by the volun-
tary disclosure perspective. 
 
Staff Accounting Bulletin 92 - The 
context for this study is a dynamic 
model involving an explicit change in 
disclosure regulation.  This change in 
regulation has a significant impact on 
the disclosure costs/benefits trade-off in 
the chemical industry. Prior to June 
1993, the accrual and disclosure of con-
tingent environmental liabilities were 
subject to considerable discretion. For 
example, if contingent liabilities were 
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less than five percent of total liabilities 
then disclosure was not required (Barth, 
McNichols, & Wilson, 1997).  Further-
more many companies used uncertainty 
of measure as justification for not dis-
closing environmental liabilities at all 
(Roberts and Hohl, 1994). In June 1993, 
SAB922 was issued, requiring compa-
nies to strictly follow FASB SFAS No. 5 
and Interpretation No. 14, particularly 
the requirement to accrue the best esti-
mate in a range of estimates.   The rule 
also eliminated zero as a choice of best 
estimates in situations where a known 
liability exists.   Finally, the five percent 
materiality cut-off point was eliminated 
(Barth et al. 1997).   
 
The impact on disclosure of SAB92 has 
been the subject of prior investigation.  
For example, Stanny (1998) showed that 
firms responded to the SAB92 call for 
environmental liability disclosure by 
increasing their disclosure of other envi-
ronmental information, and by increas-
ing the amounts reserved for future 
remediation.  In this current paper we 
use the discretionary nature of the previ-
ous five percent cut-off rule to ask 
whether or not companies that voluntar-
ily disclosed their environmental liabili-
ties differed from other companies in 
terms of their respective levels of emis-
sions.  We also examine whether these 
companies, having lost the discretion to 
make one particular type of disclosure, 
chose some other form of new disclosure 
after SAB92 came into effect.  In this 
manner we seek to identify deliberate 
managerial disclosure strategy. 
 
This paper extends the work of Blac-
coniere and Patten (1994), and Blac-
coniere and Northcut (1997), who said 
that shareholders interpret environ-
mental disclosure as a signal of manage-
ment expertise.  If it can be shown that 
certain companies, identified on the ba-
sis of disclosure content before June 
1993, altered their disclosure content 
after June 1993, then this could be evi-
dence of deliberate signaling behaviour. 
For example, if signaling (if that is in-
deed what it is) occurred before June 
1993 by means of disclosure of environ-
mental liabilities (a form of FOFI), then 
a response to the regulatory change 
could be an increase in the disclosure of 
other future-oriented financial informa-
tion. On the other hand, Walden and 
Schwartz (1997) said that management 
relies on non-financial elements of dis-
closure to capture the subtle aspects of 
impressions management.  If signaling 
was an intended corporate disclosure 
strategy, it is possible that these compa-
nies responded to SAB92 by releasing 
2   Effective June 1993, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 
No. 92 provided the SEC’s interpretation of GAAP 
with regard to contingent liabilities, environmental 
liabilities in particular. Its purpose was to promote the 
timely recognition of contingent losses and to address 
the diversity in practice with respect to accounting for 
and disclosing of environmental liabilities. The SEC 
had found this diversity to be unacceptable. SABs are 
administrative interpretations and principles rather than 
official rules; however, they do provide insight into the 
kinds of deficiencies likely to result in SEC enforce-
ment actions – a costly and undesirable outcome for 
registrants (Fekrat, Inclan & Petroni, 1996). Three key 
requirements of SAB92 are these:  
(i) Contingent liabilities must be displayed on the 
balance sheet separately from any recoveries 
recognized;  there must be no offsetting;  
(ii) Discounting of an environmental liability for 
a specific site is only appropriate under the 
conditions noted in EIFT 93-5. In addition, 
the discount rate must be no higher than the 
rate on risk-free monetary assets with a matur-
ity corresponding to the expected cash pay-
ments;  
Disclosure is expected to follow strictly FASB SFAS 
No. 5 and Interpretation No. 14; in particular, the re-
quirement to accrue the best estimate in a range, even if 
a point-estimate is uncertain. In SAB92, the SEC staff 
noted that zero is unlikely to be the ‘best estimate in the 
range’ if a known liability exists, and that it will not 
accept lack of certainty as a justification for the failure 
to provide investors with all material factors relating to 
contingent liabilities. 
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additional non-financial discussion such 
as information about uncertainty, or 
about management commitment to envi-
ronmental protection, as a way to man-
age investor impressions. 
 
It is also possible that a deliberate 
change in disclosure following the intro-
duction of SAB92 is not evidence of 
signal behaviour.  A change in disclo-
sure may reflect the rebalancing of po-
litical costs. An examination of the rela-
tionship of environmental performance 
with disclosure will provide insight here.  
If the good environmental performers 
(low pollution emitters) make the greater 
disclosures both before and after the 
change in regulation, then we have evi-
dence of signaling behaviour.  On the 
other hand if this is not the case, then 
some other factors are driving the disclo-
sure decision-making process. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
ANALYSIS  
 
Sample selection  
 
This study uses a sample of annual re-
ports covering the period 1991 to 1996. 
This time frame spans the introduction 
of SAB92.  SAB92 outlines the SEC 
interpretation of generally accepted ac-
counting principles concerning contin-
gent liabilities. The objective of SAB92 
was to reduce the diversity of corporate 
practice in the accounting for and disclo-
sure of environmental liabilities. The 
companies chosen for this study are all 
U.S. firms in the chemical industry 
(primary SIC 28) that are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange and that re-
ported an accrued environmental liabil-
ity. These selection criteria eliminate 
variation due to industry, market and 
country-specific factors while providing 
some assurance that each company con-
tends with issues related to environ-
mental liabilities. The initial sample was 
obtained by using a key-word search of 
the Edgar database of electronic filings 
of SEC-registered companies; this proc-
ess identified 28 chemical companies 
that reported an environmental liability 
accrual in one or more years of the study 
period. In order to ensure that data 
would be available to study the periods 
before and after the date of interest, the 
sample was restricted to companies that 
accrued environmental liabilities in each 
of the years 1991 to 1996. This restric-
tion reduced the sample to 11 companies 
(see appendix A) with six observations 
for each company (66 annual reports).  
While this sample is relatively small, it 
provides sufficient degrees of freedom 
to estimate all the empirical models used 
to test the study’s hypotheses, since 
none of the models have more than five 
independent variables. 
 
Dependent variables  
  
Environmental disclosure was measured 
using the companies’ annual reports. 
While environmental disclosure is not 
limited to the annual report (Zéghal & 
Ahmed, 1990), this report is the most 
widely circulated communications docu-
ment for investors, creditors and other 
users (Hutchin, 1994; Epstein and Freed-
man, 1994; CICA, 1994; Barron, Kile & 
O’Keefe, 1999). Rankin (1996) observed 
that most stakeholders seeking environ-
mental information look first to the an-
nual report. While the emergence of the 
standalone environmental report in the 
1990s and corporate website reporting in 
the 2000s has led to questions about the 
relative importance of the annual report 
as a disclosure medium, annual report 
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disclosure of environmental information 
was on an upward trend at that time 
(Gibson and O’Donovan, 2000).  
 
The disclosure literature describes sev-
eral tools for analyzing information con-
tent, and the index used in any particular 
study is often designed to reflect the as-
pects of disclosure that are the focus of 
that particular research. This suggests 
that in a given situation some disclosure 
tools may be more appropriate than oth-
ers. This study uses alternative disclo-
sure scores developed in prior research, 
each involving some form of content 
analysis that identifies the extent and/or 
nature of environmental information.  
    
The Wiseman (1982) study used a com-
prehensive disclosure measure of com-
pany efforts to minimize the consump-
tion of and damage to environmental 
resources (appendix B). This broadly 
defined measure, hereafter referred to as 
the Wiseman index, was designed to 
measure both monetary and narrative 
disclosure.  The Wiseman index is a 
quantitative score that captures both the 
extensiveness and quality of disclosure. 
In contrast, Barth, McNichols, and Wil-
son (1997) designed an index to reflect 
the extent to which disclosure captures 
the salient features of U.S. Superfund 
site liabilities (appendix C). As it is 
linked to a specific piece of legislation, 
the Barth, McNichols, and Wilson 
(BMW) score is more narrow in scope 
than the Wiseman index.  
 
Prior studies have also measured disclo-
sure in terms of the number of words of 
environmental discussion in the annual 
report. While this method fails to reflect 
the emphasis that management places on 
a particular topic (a 10,000 word report 
with 500 words of environmental discus-
sion would automatically outscore a 
2000 word report with a 200 word envi-
ronmental discussion), a simple word 
count has been employed in numerous 
publications as a measure of manage-
ment response to environmental or other 
social responsibility issues  (Cowen, 
Ferreri, & Parker, 1987; Guthrie & 
Parker, 1989; Patten, 1991; Neu, War-
same, & Pedwell, 1998).  
 
Magness (2006) developed a disclosure 
index using a point system designed to 
reflect the disclosure guidelines of the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants’ Handbook. This index was 
initially designed for application in the 
Canadian mining industry, and has been 
modified here to capture additional dis-
closure items specified by U.S. account-
ing standards (appendix D). Given its 
focus on operational issues, the Magness 
index is more narrowly defined than the 
Wiseman index.  
 
The Magness score is unweighted. Un-
weighted scores were used by Blac-
coniere and Patten (1994) and Blac-
coniere and Northcut (1997) in an effort 
to assess share response to the quantity 
of information disclosed.  Weighted 
scores award higher points to informa-
tion that is quantified, specific, and veri-
fiable, and lower points to information 
containing vague statements that need 
not necessarily reflect any actual action 
on the company's part.  For example, 
Wiseman (1982) awarded three points 
for quantified information, two for non-
quantitative but specific information, 
and one for general qualitative informa-
tion items.  With a weighted scoring tool 
such as this, the higher scores are more 
likely to reflect disclosure of quantified 
information.  This cannot be guaranteed, 
however.  A document with a sufficient 
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3  The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a joint initia-
tive of the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies and the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gram is an alternative disclosure system that we did not 
use in this study.  The objective of the GRI, introduced 
in 1997,  is to develop a globally accepted reporting 
framework to enhance the quality and rigour of sustain-
ability reporting.  Our study period predates the intro-
duction of the GRI.  For this reason we do not attempt 
to assess disclosure using GRI guidelines. 
number of low value items could have a 
score that exceeds that of a document 
containing just one or two high value 
items.  This problem can be overcome 
by grouping the unweighted items into 
subscores, with each subscore defined 
according to content.  For example, one 
subscore could contain quantified infor-
mation, a second could have the volun-
tary information items, while a third 
could include future-oriented items.  
This approach was used by Barth, 
McNichols and Wilson (1997) who be-
gan with a thirteen-item unweighted 
score in the initial application of their 
statistical model, and then used sub-
scores in four reiterations. 
 
In this paper we use both the BMW and 
the Magness scoring systems to assem-
ble the unweighted items into subscores.  
The weighted Wiseman score is also 
split into subscores.  In all, we generate 
eight alternative disclosure measures to 
be used as dependent variables, as 
shown in Table 1. We use the Wiseman 
and BMW indexes to create measures of 
financial and non-financial disclosure. 
We draw upon the US Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board Concepts 
Statement No.2 (FASB, 1978), which 
calls for information that helps users to 
assess the amount, timing and uncer-
tainty of future cash flows, to generate 
alternative combinations of the Magness 
index items.  Our objective with the 
Magness score is to capture information 
specific to cash flow prediction as well 
as uncertainty3.  
 
The Wiseman and BMW measures were 
each rated by two different research as-
sistants, neither of whom were aware of 
the nature of prospective tests. The rat-
ers’ scores were then averaged. In the 
case of disagreement between the raters, 
one of the authors’ scores was included 
in the average. However, inter-rater reli-
ability was assessed for consistency and 
found to be high. For example, the aver-
age net difference for the WSUM scores 
was 3.2 (compared to WSUM’s mean of 
28.85). For BMW-SUM scores, the av-
erage net difference was 0.13 (compared 
to BMW-SUM’s mean of 6.75). The 
Magness scores were rated by the two 
co-authors. For MSUM the average net 
difference was 0.18 (compared to 
MSUM’s mean of 3.45). The WORDS 
measure was calculated by one of the 
authors using the standard word-count 
tool in word processing software (MS-
Word). The WORDS measure is an ob-
jectively determined quantity, so alter-
nate raters were not used during applica-
tion of the WORDS disclosure tool. 
 
Prior literature has found several factors 
to be correlated with the extent and na-
ture of disclosure.  For example, corpo-
rate environmental disclosure is ex-
pected to be related to the company’s 
size and financial performance (Patten, 
1992; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; 
Bewley & Li, 2000). These factors are 
included as controls in this study. The 
key dependent variable is environmental 
disclosure, assessed using derivatives of 
several broad-based disclosure measures 
used in prior literature. 
 
In our final step we use a measure of 
environmental performance as the de-
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pendent variable.  We follow Al-
Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes 
(2004) and Clarkson, Li, Richardson and 
Vasvari (2008) by choosing Toxic Re-
lease Inventory emissions volumes as a 
measure of environmental performance. 
The TRI was introduced by the US En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 
1989 under the provisions of the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act.  The EPA initiated this 
program in an effort to use "the power of 
information" as a regulatory instrument 
(Konar and Cohen 1997).   Manufactur-
ing facilities with 10 or more employees 
that produce or use volumes above a 
Disclosure meas-
ures used as de-
pendent vari-
ables 
Disclosure character-
istics captured by the 
measure 
Index used to 
create meas-
ure 
Index items 
included in 
measure 
W-F 
  
Financial aspects of 
environmental informa-
tion 
  
Wiseman 
disclosure 
index 
(Appendix B) 
W1–W7 and 
W19–W25 
W-NF 
  
General (non-financial) 
environmental informa-
tion 
W8–W18 
  
BMW-F Superfund related fi-
nancial disclosure items 
Barth, 
McNichols & 
Wilson dis-
closure index 
(Appendix  
C) 
BMW4– 
BMW13 
BMW-NF Superfund related non-
financial disclosure 
items 
BMW1– 
BMW3 
  
M-CF 
  
Information about 
amounts and timing of 
future environment-
related cash flows 
  
  
Magness dis-
closure index 
(Appendix D) 
M3, 4, 5, 7 
M-UNCERT 
  
Information about un-
certainties of environ-
ment-related future 
cash flows 
M1, 2, 6 
M-FOFI 
  
Future-oriented finan-
cial information about 
environment-related 
cash flows 
M4, 5, 7 
  
WORDS 
  
Annual report space 
devoted to all environ-
mental issues 
N/A N/A (word 
count) 
Table 1 
Dependent variable disclosure measure descriptions and mapping to underlying 
disclosure indexes 
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threshold amount of chemicals on a list 
of over 300 chemicals must report their 
emissions of these chemicals to the 
EPA.  This information is provided to 
the public on an annual basis.  Emissions 
are self-reported, on a site-by-site basis. 
Companies can have several sites.  The 
TRI measure in this paper is the aggre-
gate emissions of TRI-reportable sub-
stances across all sites for each company 
in each year, scaled by the total assets of 
the company. 
 
Of the 11 companies considered in this 
study, we were unable to find TRI data 
for two of them.  Most likely this is be-
cause these two companies had meas-
ures of toxic emissions that were below 
the regulatory reporting thresholds. Ini-
tially we considered deleting these two 
companies from our study.  However, 
given that our analysis is already re-
stricted to a small amount of data, we 
decided to proceed with all 11 compa-
nies.  The impact of these two compa-
nies on the results is assessed in the Sen-
sitivity Analysis section of this paper. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Our hypotheses are designed to investi-
gate the use of signaling as a disclosure 
strategy.   We look for the disclosure of 
an immaterial liability as a signal. If 
some firms used this type of disclosure 
for signaling purposes, SAB92 would 
have rendered their strategy ineffective 
by eliminating the choice to disclose 
environmental liabilities that are less 
than five percent of the company's total 
financial obligations. To re-establish an 
effective signal these firms would have 
needed to find a new form of disclosure. 
We test this argument with the following 
two hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Firms that voluntarily disclosed 
environmental liabilities pre-SAB92 in-
creased other FOFI disclosure after 
SAB92 more than firms whose pre-
SAB92 disclosures were mandatory. 
(FOFI signaling hypothesis) 
 
H2: Firms that voluntarily disclosed 
environmental liabilities pre-SAB92 in-
creased general environmental disclo-
sure after SAB92 more than firms whose 
pre-SAB92 disclosures were mandatory. 
(General environmental disclosure - 
signaling hypothesis) 
 
In our final hypothesis, we examine 
whether the basis for signaling behav-
iour (if any) is environmental perform-
ance: 
 
H3: Firms that voluntarily disclosed 
environmental liabilities pre-SAB92 dif-
fer from other firms in their level of TRI 
emissions. (Basis of signaling hypothe-
sis) 
 
Independent variables  
 
We create two dummy variables, REG 
and SIGNAL. 
REG (H1-H2) is equal to 1 for annual 
reports prepared after June 1993, the 
implementation date for SAB92; 0 oth-
erwise. The EPA requires companies to 
seek expert advice on the quantification 
of remediation cost. SAB92 clarified the 
FASB's accounting standard for contin-
gent liabilities (SFAS No.5) by stating 
that the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion will not accept uncertainty of meas-
urement as an argument for failure to 
disclose an estimate or related material 
factors. The direction of REG in the sig-
naling hypotheses (H1 and H2) is ex-
pected to be tempered by the presence of 
SIGNAL as discussed below. 
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SIGNAL (H1-H2) equals 1 if the firm 
disclosed an environmental liability that 
is less than 5% of total liabilities prior to 
the enactment of SAB92 in June 1993, 0 
otherwise. Disclosure of an environ-
mental liability below the threshold no 
longer acts as a signal of high quality 
once SAB92 is introduced. If signaling 
were the original intent, then those SIG-
NAL =1 firms are expected to renew 
their “signal” through additional non-
financial or future-oriented financial 
disclosures after SAB92 came into force. 
To measure this, SIGNAL is interacted 
with REG.  There is evidence of signal-
ing behaviour if the coefficient of SIG-
NAL *REG is positive. 
 
Two control variables are defined to 
capture company size and financial per-
formance. 
 
SIZE (H1-H3) is measured as the log of 
total assets. In keeping with prior studies 
(Patten, 1992; Neu, Warsame, & Ped-
well, 1998; Bewley & Li, 2000), the co-
CONTINUOUS 
VARIABLES 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Minimum Maximum 
WSUM 28.85 10.29 28.00 9.00 51.00 
WF 20.46 6.28 20.00 5.50 33.00 
WNF 8.40 5.18 8.00 0.00 21.00 
BMW-SUM 6.75 1.95 6.50 2.00 10.50 
BMW-F 5.65 1.36 5.50 2.00 8.00 
BMW-NF 1.10 0.84 1.00 0.00 2.50 
MSUM 3.45 1.41 3.50 0.50 6.50 
M-CF 2.10 1.05 2.25 0.50 3.50 
M-UNCERT 1.50 0.69 1.50 0.00 3.00 
M-FOFI 1.66 0.78 1.50 0.50 3.00 
WORDS 1145.70 829.71 999.5 178.0 4069.0 
SIZE 14.65 1.13 14.4 12.8 17.5 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.04 –.10 0.3 
TRI 2.03 3.92 0.61 0.00 24.5 
 
CATEGORICAL 
VARIABLES 
Yes (%) No  (%) Total   
SAB92 in force (REG=1) 
  
44  (67%) 22  (33%) 66  (100%) 
Environmental liability disclosed 
voluntarily (SIGNAL=1) 
42  (64%) 24  (36%) 66  (100%) 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics - Variable Distributions and Definitions 
(n= 11 companies X 6 years, 66 observations) 
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efficient for the size factor is expected to 
be positive, as larger firms are observed 
to provide more extensive disclosures 
than smaller firms.  
 
 ROA (H1-H2) is net income divided by 
total assets. Prior studies are contradic-
tory in their findings with regard to the 
relationship of environmental disclosure 
with return on assets. See, for example, 
the discussion in Gray, Javad, Power, & 
Sinclair (2001). For this reason there is 
no prior expectation as to the direction 
of association.  
Descriptive statistics are reported in Ta-
ble 2. The continuous variables are dis-
tributed with their means close to their 
medians and exhibit reasonable variabil-
ity between their minimum and maxi-
mum values. The categorical variables 
also exhibit a reasonable degree of vari-
ability.  
 
Empirical Models  
 
The signaling argument presented in H1 
and H2 is tested in model [1]: 
[1]  Disclosureit = b0 + b1REG it + b2 
The dependent variables are defined as follows for company i, year t: 
  WSUM   = total Wiseman disclosure index score 
  WF        = Wiseman index score, financial information only 
  WNF      = Wiseman index score, non-financial information only 
  BMW-SUM   = total BMW disclosure index score 
  BMW-F         = BMW index score, financial disclosure items only 
  BMW-NF    = BMW index score, non-financial disclosure items only 
  MSUM  = total Magness index score - cash flow information  
  M-CF  = Magness index information items relating to amounts and timing of future 
cash flows 
  M-UNCERT  = Magness index disclosures of information about uncertainty of future cash 
flows 
  M- FOFI  = Magness index disclosures future-oriented financial information  
  WORDS =  word count for all environmental annual report discussion 
  TRI  = aggregate TRI emissions, scaled by total assets 
  BMW-SUM  = total BMW disclosure index score 
  BMW-F  = BMW index score, financial disclosure items only 
  BMW-NF  = BMW index score, non-financial disclosure items only 
  MSUM  = total Magness index score - cash flow information  
  M-CF  = Magness index information items relating to amounts and timing of future 
cash flows 
  M-UNCERT  = Magness index disclosures of information about uncertainty of future cash 
flows 
  M- FOFI  = Magness index disclosures future-oriented financial information  
  WORDS =  word count for all environmental annual report discussion 
  TRI  = aggregate TRI emissions, scaled by total assets 
 
The independent variables are defined as follows for company i, year t: 
  SIZE  = log of total assets 
  REG = 0 if pre SAB92, 1 if post 
  ROA  = net income/total assets 
  SIGNAL = 1 if firm voluntarily discloses environmental liability less than 5% of its 
total liabilities, 0 otherwise 
  SIGNAL*REG = SIGNAL times REG  
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SIZE it + b3 ROA it +b4 SIGNAL it  
+ b5 SIGNAL it *REG it + eit 
 
where Disclosureit is M-FOFI for H1 
and WNF, BMW-NF, M-UNCERT, or 
WORDS for H2. 
 
The following chart shows how the coef-
ficient estimates in the above models 
relate to the hypothesis tests. Each com-
bination of coefficients corresponds to 
the calculation of the estimated y-
intercept as it would appear in a graphed 
depiction of the relationship among vari-
ables. 
 Mandatory Dis-
closer group 
(SIGNAL = 0 ) 
Discretionary 
Discloser group 
(SIGNAL = 1) 
Pre-regulation period (REG = 0)   b0 b0  + b4 
Post-regulation period (REG = 1) 
  
b0 + b1  b0 + b1  + b4  + b5 
Difference between pre- and post-regulation 
periods  
  
 b1 
  
b1  + b5 
 Hypothesis tests: 
H1: FOFI signaling hypothesis 
H2: General environmental disclosure sig-
naling hypothesis 
  b1 + b5  > 0 
  
b1 + b5  > 0 
In our final test, we investigate the basis 
of distinction between the SIGNAL=0 
companies and the SIGNAL=1 compa-
nies, using the following model:  
[2] TRI it =c0 + c1t SIGNAL it + c2 
SIZE it  + eit 
 
If the basis for the voluntary environ-
mental liability disclosure is indeed sig-
naling, then c1t should be statistically 
significant and negative.  If the coeffi-
cient is positive, this suggests the moti-
vation for distinctive disclosure is the 
balancing of political costs, rather than 
the wish to advertise management exper-
tise. 
 
Our data consist of pooled cross-
sectional and time series observations. 
When there are multiple observations 
from the same company, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression introduces 
serial correlation which can result in 
inefficient estimators. Thus the general-
ized least squares (GLS) estimation 
method is more appropriate than OLS 
for this study’s data because it can pro-
vide more efficient regression coeffi-
cient estimates. (The OLS results are 
similar to the GLS results, as discussed 
in the Sensitivity Analysis section of this 
paper.) Goodness-of-fit for the GLS 
models is measured using Buse (1973).  
 
Prior to examining our hypotheses we 
conducted validation tests to assess the 
comprehensiveness of our alternative 
disclosure measures, using the model 
 
 Disclosureit  = b0 + b1REG it + b2 SIZE it 
+ b3 ROA it  + eit 
 
We use WF, BMW-F, or M-CF as alter-
native financial environmental disclo-
sure subscores, and WNF, BMW-NF, 
M-UNCERT or WORDS for the gen-
eral, non-financial disclosure.  Each of 
our financial disclosure measures shows 
a statistically significant increase when 
SAB92 came into effect, suggesting that 
our content scores successfully capture 
the extent of financial disclosure both 
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before and after the change in regula-
tion.   For the general disclosure meas-
ures, the REG factor is statistically sig-
nificant (p = 0.05 or less) when disclo-
sure is measured using both MUNCERT 
and WORDS, but not when using the 
WNF or BMW-NF measures. (In the 
interest of saving space, detailed results 
of these validation tests are not re-
ported.)  Possibly the Wiseman and 
BMW indices do not lend themselves 
well to the measure of non-financial in-
formation.  For example the BMW index 
is biased toward financial disclosure, 
and the Wiseman tool is structured in a 
manner that assigns higher scores to in-
formation that is expressed in financial 
terms.  The bias in favour of financial 
disclosure in two of the four general dis-
closure scores possibly explains the in-
consistent results.  (We make additional 
comment on the non-financial disclo-
sures in the Sensitivity Analysis section 
of this paper.) 
 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
Table 3 reports the results for H1, the 
first signaling hypothesis. If companies' 
disclosures are tailored so as to distin-
guish the company from its peers, and if 
the signals are adequately captured by 
the variables in the model, it should be 
possible to identify distinctive disclosure 
both before and after the change in re-
porting guidelines. The results indicate 
that companies that voluntarily disclosed 
an immaterial environmental liability 
before the SAB92 regulation was in 
force increased their FOFI disclosures 
after SAB92 came into effect. This is 
indicated by the statistical significance 
(p < 0.05) and positive sign of the b1 + 
b5 coefficient. Furthermore, the b4 coef-
ficient is statistically significant and 
negative. These findings suggest that 
these voluntary disclosers provided less 
FOFI prior to SAB92 (distinctive behav-
iour) when contingent liability disclo-
sure was their signal, and more FOFI 
after SAB92 (distinctive behaviour 
again), when they needed a new signal. 
Overall, there is reasonable support for 
the first signaling hypothesis.  
 
We do not find evidence to support H2, 
the second signaling hypothesis, regard-
less of the dependent variable used. 
(These results are not shown.) In other 
words there is no evidence that compa-
nies that are pre-identified according to 
their disclosure before SAB92 increased 
their disclosure of non-financial infor-
mation after SAB92.   
 
In our final test (see Table 4) we exam-
ine the relationship of environmental 
performance with SIGNAL.  The goal is 
to establish whether or not companies 
that voluntarily disclosed an immaterial 
liability can be distinguished from other 
companies on the basis of their TRI 
emission volumes.  Using aggregate TRI 
emissions, scaled by total assets, we find 
the voluntary disclosers had higher 
emissions than other companies. This is 
indicated by the statistical significance 
(p < 0.05) and positive direction of the 
SIGNAL factor.  It was necessary to 
drop two of the companies from this part 
of the analysis because the TRI database 
had no reports for them.  In Table 4 we 
report the results of our findings using 
only 54 datapoints as opposed to 66.  
However we assessed the sensitivity of 
our earlier results to the omission of 
these two companies.  Those findings 
are discussed below.   
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coefficient 
(predicted 
sign) 
Coefficient estimates [p-values] 
REG 
b1 
(+/–) 
SIZE 
b2 
(+) 
ROA 
b3 
(+/–) 
SIG-
NAL 
b4 
(–) 
SIG-
NAL*
REG 
b5 
(+) 
Inter-
cept 
b0 
(+/–) 
H3 
test: 
b1+ b5 
(+) 
Buse 
[1973] 
R2 
Dep. Vari-
able 
                
M-FOFI –0.04 
[.645] 
0.16 
[.027] 
0.62 
[.394] 
–1.01 
[.000] 
0.71 
[.000] 
–0.58 
[.579] 
0.67 
[.000] 
.47 
Table 3 
H1: Firms that voluntarily disclosed their environmental liabilities before SAB92 in-
creased their FOFI disclosure after SAB92 more than firms whose pre-SAB92 disclo-
sures were mandatory 
   ( n = 11 companies X 6 years,  66 observations ) 
The dependent variable is  
  M- FOFI  = Magness index disclosure of future-oriented financial information  
 
The independent variables are defined as follows for company i, year t: 
  SIZE  = log of total assets 
  REG  = 0 if pre SAB92, 1 if post 
  ROA  = net income/total assets 
SIGNAL = 1 if firm voluntarily discloses environmental liability less than 5% of its 
total liabilities, 0 otherwise 
SIGNAL*REG = SIGNAL times REG  
Table 4 
H3: Firms that voluntarily disclosed their environmental liabilities pre-SAB92 
differ from other firms in their level of TRI emissions. 
 ( n = 9 companies X 6 years,  54 observations)  
[2]  TRI it =b0 + b1 SIGNAL it + b2 SIZE it  + eit 
  
  
coefficient 
(predicted 
sign) 
Coefficient estimates 
[p-values] 
SIGNAL 
b1 
(+) 
SIZE 
b2 
(+) 
Intercept 
b0 
(+/–) 
Buse 
[1973] 
R2 
Dep.  
Variable 
        
TRI 3.15 
[.000] 
-0.01 
[.944] 
0.39 
[.779] 
0.40 
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Sensitivity analysis 
 
We test the robustness of our findings by 
using alternative measures of financial 
performance.  For example, return on 
investment (net income divided by mar-
ket value of equity) and return on equity 
(net income divided by opening book 
value of equity) are each used in place of 
ROA. When return on equity is used, the 
p-value for the coefficient estimates are 
lower for the financial performance con-
trol variable. However, as this sensitivity 
is restricted to the coefficient estimate 
for a control variable, this finding does 
not affect the main conclusion of the 
study. The other coefficient estimates 
and goodness of fit measures of the 
models are not substantially different 
from those shown in Table 3.  
 
The signaling model used to examine 
hypotheses 1 and 2 were supplemented 
with financial variables that prior litera-
ture has found to be correlated with dis-
closure.  For example, leverage (total 
liabilities divided by total assets) was 
added to the model, along with a meas-
ure of changes in long-term debt financ-
ing, and changes in equity financing.  
Tobin’s Q (market value of common 
shares, plus book value of preferred 
shares and total liabilities, all divided by 
total assets) was also used as an alterna-
tive measure of financial performance.  
Unlike the ROA, ROE and ROI meas-
ures, which are derived from historic 
financial statement data, Tobin’s Q is an 
indicator of investors’ perception of the 
value of the companies’ assets and as 
such brings a more future-oriented per-
spective.   The results of these sensitivity 
tests did not contradict the earlier find-
ing that companies use FOFI (as op-
posed to general non-financial informa-
tion) for signaling purposes.    
 
Each of the analyses was repeated using 
ordinary least squares regression.  The 
direction of correlation between depend-
ent and independent variables was the 
same in all models regardless of whether 
OLS or GLS was used, however the ex-
planatory power of the models tended to 
be much lower, and the p-values higher, 
when OLS was used.  For example, in 
the examination of H1, the b1+b5 coeffi-
cient is statistically significant using 
both OLS and GLS, however the ex-
planatory power is only 0.15 using OLS, 
as opposed to 0.47 using GLS.  Using 
OLS regression to examine H3, the cor-
relation of emissions with SIGNAL was 
statistically significant at p < 0.05, how-
ever the explanatory power was 0.10, 
down from 0.40 using GLS. Finally, our 
OLS examination of pollution perform-
ance versus disclosure (H3) supports the 
GLS interpretation, however the ex-
planatory power using OLS was only 
0.10 down from 0.40 when GLS was 
used.  The OLS results are not reported. 
When we examined H3, which looked at 
the relationship of TRI emissions with 
the decision to make this voluntary dis-
closure, we dropped two of the 11 com-
The dependent variable is defined as 
  TRI    = Aggregate TRI emissions (in tons)/total assets  
 
The independent variables are defined as follows for company i, year t: 
   SIGNAL = 1 if firm voluntarily discloses environmental liability less than 5% of its total 
liabilities, 0 otherwise 
  SIZE  = log of total assets 
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panies. Of the two companies deleted, 
one was a discretionary discloser 
(SIGNAL=1), the other was not. We 
wondered whether the inclusion of data 
from these companies influenced the 
findings of the earlier parts of the study. 
For this reason we repeated the earlier 
regressions using only the data from the 
remaining nine companies.  We found 
no change to the findings of our valida-
tion tests or to the results reported in 
Table 3.  In other words, the removal of 
two companies from the analysis had no 
impact on the findings with regard to the 
hypothesized change in level of finan-
cial, or non-financial disclosure at the 
Table 5 
H2: Firms that voluntarily disclosed their environmental liabilities before SAB92 in-
creased their general non-financial disclosure after SAB92 more than firms whose 
pre-SAB92 disclosures were mandatory 
   ( n = 9 companies X 6 years,  54 observations ) 
 
[2]Dependent variable=b0 + b1REG + b2 SIZE + b3 ROA+b4 SIGNAL+ b5 SIG-
NAL*REG + εit 
  
  
  
coefficient 
(predicted sign) 
Coefficient estimates 
[p-values] 
REG 
b1 
(+/–) 
SIZE 
b2 
(+) 
ROA 
b3 
(+/–) 
SIG-
NAL 
b4 
(–) 
SIG-
NAL*R
EG 
b5 
(+) 
Inter-
cept 
b0 
(+/–) 
H2 
test: 
b1+ b5 
(+) 
Buse 
[1973] 
R2 
Dep. Variable                 
WNF -0.34 
[.730] 
2.62 
[.000] 
-4.37 
[.561] 
-3.42 
[.001] 
1.49 
[.188] 
–
29.61 
[.000] 
1.15 
[.058] 
.62 
BMW-NF –0.11 
[.121] 
0.35 
[.000] 
1.63 
[.027] 
–1.14 
[.000] 
0.44 
[.000] 
–3.38 
[.001] 
0.34 
[.001] 
.53 
M-UNCERT -0.04 
[.537] 
0.23 
[.000] 
1.29 
[.042] 
-0.398 
[.004] 
0.14 
[.095] 
–1.87 
[.000] 
0.10 
[.046] 
.52 
WORDS 401.01
8 
[.017] 
201.8 
[.001] 
4253.6 
[.000] 
–
472.65 
[.100] 
–228.0 
[.274] 
–
1942.
1 
[.036] 
236.01 
[.002] 
.51 
The dependent variables are defined as follows for company i, year t: 
  WNF = Wiseman index score, non-financial information only 
  BMW-NF   = BMW index score, non-financial disclosure items only 
  M-UNCERT = Magness index disclosures of information about uncertainty of future cash 
flows 
  WORDS =  word count for all environmental annual report discussion 
The independent variables are defined as follows for company i, year t: 
  REG  = 0 if pre SAB92, 1 if post 
  SIZE  = log of total assets 
  ROA  = net income/total assets 
  SIGNAL  = 1 if firm voluntarily discloses environmental liability less than 5% of its 
total liabilities, 0 otherwise 
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time that SAB92 was implemented, nor 
did it affect our interpretation with re-
gard to the level of FOFI disclosure be-
fore or after the change in regulation.  
However, our re-examination of H2, the 
second signaling hypotheses, produced 
interesting results.  For example, we 
found the Barth, McNichol and Wilson 
non-financial disclosure score (BMW-
NF) and the Magness score reflecting 
cash flow uncertainty (M-UNCERT) 
were both disclosed at higher levels by 
the SIGNAL=1 companies after SAB92 
came into effect.  Furthermore, in both 
cases the b4 coefficient was statistically 
significant and negative, indicating the 
voluntary disclosers provide less of this 
information prior to the introduction of 
SAB92.   
 
 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND FU-
TURE DIRECTIONS  
 
In this paper we examine the disclosure 
of environmental information by US 
chemical companies both before and 
after a change in disclosure regulation.  
We use the decision to disclose an im-
material environmental liability, which 
was a voluntary disclosure prior to the 
implementation of SAB92, to distin-
guish two types of companies:  discre-
tionary versus mandatory disclosers.  
We explore the following questions: 
Do companies use disclosure to distin-
guish themselves from other companies?  
Our findings suggest they do.  When 
SAB92 made the disclosure of an imma-
terial liability mandatory, those compa-
nies that had previously disclosed this 
liability voluntarily began to disclose 
other future-oriented financial informa-
tion.  This is indicative of signaling be-
haviour, given the costliness of this kind 
of information. Similar to an environ-
mental liability, FOFI is by nature for-
ward looking in terms of prospective 
cash flow.  FOFI is also more credible 
than other sorts of information, specifi-
cally because management must engage 
specific expertise in order to obtain it 
(Toms, 2002).  The engagement of spe-
cific expertise, however, is costly. The 
costliness of this information is consis-
tent with the finding that companies dis-
closed less of it before SAB92 came into 
effect.  The costliness of this informa-
tion is consistent with signaling theory 
in that other companies cannot easily 
mimic the companies that are providing 
this information. 
 
Is environmental performance the basis 
for this disclosure strategy?  Our evi-
dence suggests it is.  We use the volume 
of toxic release inventory emissions re-
ported to the EPA as a measure of envi-
ronmental performance, and we find that 
companies who adopt distinctive disclo-
sure strategy differ from other compa-
nies in terms of their pollution levels. 
Is the distinctive disclosure strategy mo-
tivated by managers’ wish to advertise 
‘high quality’?  Our findings do not sup-
port this argument.  In fact, we find the 
distinctive disclosers are relatively poor 
in terms of their environmental perform-
ance. 
 
In summary, while we have used the 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Blac-
coniere and Northcut (1997) argument to 
introduce this paper, our findings do not 
provide the conclusion to the signaling 
argument they began to put forward.  
Our evidence shows that companies use 
environmental disclosure to convey a 
message to the external audience, and 
that they do so in a very deliberate man-
ner, however the content of that message 
is not about company quality, or man-
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agement expertise, which is the basis of 
signaling theory. 
 
Our findings suggest that some other 
interpretation of management motivation 
is required. 
 
The magnitude of environmental costs, 
and the level of public concern directed 
toward the chemical industry was dis-
cussed in an earlier part of this paper. 
Voluntary disclosure theory argues that 
disclosure in any industry involves bal-
ancing the costs of too much disclosure 
with too little.  Richardson (1998) said 
that voluntary market forces can elicit a 
‘disclosure equilibrium’ that works as 
efficiently as one where disclosure is 
mandated.  In this current paper we 
make no claim to have established that 
the levels of disclosure made by any of 
these companies are ‘efficient’ in terms 
of providing information that investors 
or other stakeholders may want.  Our 
findings suggest, however, that company 
managers reassess their disclosures 
when there is an external change, which 
in this case was the introduction of new 
financial reporting regulation.  To with-
hold information about future costs in a 
situation where environmental perform-
ance is subject to public scrutiny could 
lead outside observers - that is, investors 
as well as the other stakeholder groups 
whose actions can trigger legislative re-
percussions - to assume that manage-
ment is withholding bad news.  An as-
sumption such as this could trigger a 
negative share reaction. For this reason 
high emitters are more forthcoming with 
information. 
 
The correlation between pollution and 
disclosure in this paper contrasts the 
finding of Clarkson, Li, Richardson and 
Vasvari (2008) and Al-Tuwaijri, Chris-
tensen and Hughes (2004), that low pol-
luters are more forthcoming with envi-
ronmental information.  However Clark-
son et al. focused on information in dis-
cretionary channels and specifically ex-
cluded the financial statements.  Al-
Tuwaijri et al. (2004) used a voluntary 
aspect of environmental performance as 
a measure of environmental perform-
ance.  We believe that specific aspects of 
the research design in these two earlier 
studies, the disclosure medium on the 
one hand, the environmental perform-
ance measure on the other, suggests the 
authors may have discerned signaling 
behaviour that actually relates to ‘good 
type’ company quality, which is the ba-
sis of signaling theory.  The research 
context of our paper may account for the 
differing results.  The earlier studies are 
centred on the theme that good environ-
mental performers will be more forth-
coming with environmental information, 
and the disclosure measures assess vol-
ume and nature of information content.  
In the current paper, we examine man-
agement response over time, to a very 
explicit change in reporting require-
ments, and we limit our analysis to one 
industry.  SAB92 focuses on contingent 
environmental liabilities, an issue that is 
of primary concern to the public and to 
companies in the chemical industry. We 
cannot argue that our findings could be 
generalized to capture the motivations 
for disclosure behaviour outside this in-
dustry. 
 
The sensitivity of our results to the in-
clusion of the data from companies that 
did not make TRI reports adds an inter-
esting nuance to the interpretation of our 
results. When we used our full dataset, 
including companies both with and with-
out TRI reports, the ‘signaling’ behav-
iour was restricted to the use of financial 
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information.  This finding makes sense 
given that the change in the regulatory 
environment was a change in financial 
reporting regulation.  However, when 
we restrict our analysis to include only 
companies that made TRI reports, we 
find evidence that companies use non-
financial information as a distinguishing 
disclosure too. Walden and Schwartz 
(1997) said that managers use non-
financial information to manage stake-
holder impression.  Our findings suggest 
that when environmental performance is 
open to public scrutiny, managers en-
gage in impressions-management more 
so than when it is not.  This is a tentative 
observation only.  Any future examina-
tion of this matter would require the 
study of a much larger number of com-
panies, both with and without TRI re-
ports. 
 
This study has several limitations.  First 
of all we had only a small amount of 
data to work with.  The sample size, 
however, is more than adequate for valid 
statistical testing of the study’s hypothe-
ses.   Secondly, we did not define our 
disclosure scores in terms of mandatory 
versus discretionary items.  A future 
study that focuses on impressions-
management would be wise to make this 
distinction.  In the initial search phase of 
this study we looked for other legislative 
changes (other than SAB92) that may 
have affected the disclosure decisions of 
the companies in question. We found 
Statement of Position 96-1: Environ-
mental Remediation Liabilities (SOP96-
1), an environment-related reporting 
standard introduced in 1996 by the 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA, 1996). This stan-
dard came into effect only for fiscal 
years after December 15, 1996.  As 1996 
was the final year in our study period, 
the study is not able to assess impacts of 
later regulatory events so we did not 
consider whether or not SOP-96 
prompted another change in disclosure.  
Future study of the impact of regulation 
on disclosure strategy might consider the 
impact of SOP-96.  A study of this sort 
might also draw upon the enhanced dis-
closure framework offered by the Global 
Reporting Initiative, which was first in-
troduced in 1997.  
 
We acknowledge that the datedness of 
the study period is a limitation for as-
sessing more recent reporting features, 
such as the above-noted new disclosure 
guideline or the proliferation of environ-
mental reporting in different formats and 
media. On the other hand, our study’s 
setting can provide fundamental insights 
about managers’ reporting strategies and 
responses to regulatory changes in re-
porting requirements. These insights 
remain relevant for future regulatory 
changes and may be of particular interest 
in developing economies, such as India 
and China. As developing economies 
progress, environmental concerns are 
increasing rapidly while their environ-
mental reporting regulations remain at 
an undeveloped stage, similar to that of 
the period studied here (Malarvizhi, 
2008).  
 
SAB92 changed the reporting require-
ments pertaining to the disclosure of an 
environmental liability in an industry 
that commands considerable attention in 
the US.  Our findings show that regula-
tion elicits information beyond that re-
quired by the regulation itself.  In Can-
ada, where there is a more flexible re-
porting regime, many companies in the 
mining and oil and gas industry have 
escaped reporting their full environ-
mental remediation obligations ((Li, 
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Richardson, & Thornton, 1997) even 
though this information was recom-
mended by the CICA reporting guide-
lines.  However, more recent CICA ac-
counting standards for asset retirement 
obligations now require that for years 
beginning in 2004 or later, these compa-
nies must show the fair value of these 
obligations in their financial statements. 
Canada has a public reporting require-
ment for emissions similar to that of the 
US.  The natural resource sector is a 
large segment of the Canadian economy.  
A re-examination of our research ques-
tions in this new context should yield 
additional insights.  For example, the 
availability of a larger number of com-
panies to work with should facilitate 
further exploration of the question of 
whether companies whose emissions are 
disclosed to the public, engage in im-
pressions-management more so than 
competing companies for whom emis-
sions is private information. A study in 
the Canadian context could also inform 
the debate as to whether regulation elic-
its the disclosure of additional informa-
tion in a discretionary disclosure regime. 
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Appendix A 
List of companies 
 
 B F GOODRICH CO 
 CABOT CORP 
 CHEMED CORP 
 DEXTER CORP 
 E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 
 FREEPORT McMORAN INC 
 M A HANNA CO 
 INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC 
 PPG INDUSTRIES INC 
 ROHM & HAAS CO 
 WITCO CORP 
 
 
Appendix B 
Environmental Disclosure Index (Wiseman, 1982) 
 
Economic factors: 
M1.  Past and current expenditures for pollution control equipment and facilities 
M2.  Past and current operating costs of pollution control equipment and facilities 
M3.  Future estimates of expenditures for pollution control equipment and facili-
ties 
M4.  Future estimates of operating costs for pollution control equipment and facili-
ties 
M5.  Provisions for future site cleanup  
 
Litigation: 
M6.  Present litigation related to environmental incidents 
M7.  Potential litigation related to environmental incidents 
 
Pollution abatement: 
M8.  Air emission information 
M9.  Water discharge information 
M10. Solid waste disposal information 
M11. Control, installation, facilities, and process described 
M12. Compliance status of facilities 
 
Other environment-related information: 
M13. Discussion of regulations and requirements 
M14. Environmental policies and company concern for the environment 
M15. Conservation of natural resources 
M16. Awards for environmental protection 
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M17. Recycling effort 
M18. Department or offices for pollution control 
 
Quantitative financial environmental disclosures:     
M19. Capital expenditure 
M20. Legal expenses 
M21. Fines and penalties 
M22. Land cleanup and reclamation 
M23. Environmental contingency 
M24. Provisions for future land reclamation 
M25. Provisions for environmental litigation 
Rating scale 
3 if item described in monetary and quantitative terms 
2 if item described specifically 
1 if item discussed in general 
0 if not mentioned 
 
Appendix C 
Environmental Disclosure Index  (Barth, McNichols, & Wilson, 1997) 
 
Disclosure about firm’s affiliation with environmentally impaired sites 
BMW1 - Statement that a firm is a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) on one or 
more sites 
BMW2 - Statement that a firm is a PRP on one or more SUPERFUND sites 
BMW3 - Statement that a firm is a PRP on one or more non-SUPERFUND sites 
 
Disclosure about remediation-cost estimates 
BMW4 - Range or qualitative statement about TOTAL remediation-cost estimates 
BMW5 - Dollar amount or other information about current year’s remediation-cost 
estimates 
BMW6 - Range or qualitative statement about FUTURE remediation-cost estimates 
 
Disclosure about accrual of environmental liabilities 
BMW7 - Statement that firm accrues environmental liabilities 
BMW8 - Statement about criteria for accrual 
BMW9 - Statement about reasons for not accruing 
BMW10 - Statement that effect on financial position is substantial, immaterial or unes-
timable or some combination 
 
Disclosure about insurance applicable to environmental liabilities  
BMW11 - Statement that insurance is netted against cost estimates 
BMW12 - Statement that insurance is applicable to environmental liabilities 
BMW13 - Statement that insurance firm has settled some environmental claims 
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Appendix D 
Environmental Disclosure Index (Magness, 2003) 
 
Quantitative score ranging from 0 to 7, with one point assigned for the appearance of 
each of the following items: 
 
M1 Statements on the compliance status or compliance efforts of the company rela-
tive to environmental standards. (e.g., Discussion of efforts to keep abreast of 
operating impacts on the environment and of changing regulation. A claim such 
as “we attempt to protect the environment as  much as  possible” is not suffi-
cient.)   
M2 Existence of a board- or executive-level committee responsible for monitoring 
environmental regulation or impacts. 
M3 $ Presentation of CURRENT or PAST monetary expenditures relative to envi-
ronmental control or remediation. This refers to actual cash flows. (e.g., “We 
spent $x this year in environmental restoration.”) 
M4 $ Disclosure of estimated FUTURE cash flows relative to environmental control 
or remediation. (e.g., “We plan an additional $y cash outlay next year, or we 
plan to spend $z dollars over the next 3 years.”). This is includes details of spe-
cifically itemized expenditures planned for the near future. 
M5 $ Disclosure of total estimated FUTURE environmental liability. Must be clear. 
Should not be lumped in with other items so as to be indistinguishable. Must not 
be offset with expected recoveries unless full amount is made clear elsewhere in 
report. This item differs from M4 above, in that it tends to be a much larger ag-
gregate expenditure planned for some undefined future date. 
 M6 Statements on current or potential environmental actions or lawsuits 
against the company. 
M7 $ Disclosure of other FUTURE cash flow amount related  to environmental 
management issues (e.g., expected recovery of insurance claims, reimburse-
ments by third parties, or unaccrued portion of possible additional contingent 
environmental liability.) 
 
The Magness index was initially designed for application to the Canadian 
natural resource sector (Magness, 2006). Item M5 tends to be more applicable to those 
industries where planned remediation is one of the conditions of the permitting proc-
ess. The seven-point rating system shown here has been modified slightly from its 
original form.  
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